I met Gen. John Sheehan once when he had but one star and I was a mere midshipman. I and the rest of my classmates were doing our “Career Orientation Training” during our second class summer, and it was Marine Week in Little Creek. I and thirty or so other other mids were standing in the rain on the lawn behind what is now the EWTGLANT building waiting to turn in our rifles.

Gen. Sheehan walked up, pipe in hand, and we all came to attention as he asked, “Why are you all standing here?”

Our class leader explained what we were there to do, and the general responded, to paraphrase, “I know that, but you should be sitting, not standing. Never stand when you could be sitting, son, ’cause you never know when the next forced march might come.”

Twenty or so years later, I still sit whenever I can, and the general has spoken again, this time on why he declined an offer to be in charge of our Middle East wars. His words are worth reading:

What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is that there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region. In my view, there are essentially three strategies in play simultaneously.

The first I call “the Woody Hayes basic ground attack,” which is basically gaining one yard — or one city block — at a time. Given unconstrained time and resources, one could control the outcome in Iraq and provide the necessary security to move on to the next stage of development.

The second strategy starts with security but adds benchmarks for both the U.S. and Iraqi participants and applies time constraints that should guide them toward a desired outcome. The value of this strategy is that everyone knows the quantifiable and measurable objectives that fit within an overall strategic framework.

The third strategy takes a larger view of the region and the desired end state. Simply put, where does Iraq fit in a larger regional context? The United States has and will continue to have strategic interests in the greater Middle East well after the Iraq crisis is resolved and, as a matter of national interest, will maintain forces in the region in some form. The Iraq invasion has created a real and existential crisis for nearly all Middle Eastern countries and created divisions among our traditional European allies, making cooperation on other issues more difficult. In the case of Iran, we have allowed Tehran to develop more policy options and tools than it had a few years ago. Iran is an ideological and destabilizing threat to its neighbors and, more important, to U.S. interests.

Of the three strategies in play, the third is the most important but, unfortunately, is the least developed and articulated by this administration.
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It would have been a great honor to serve this nation again. But after thoughtful discussions with people both in and outside of this administration, I concluded that the current Washington decision-making process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region and how the parts fit together strategically. We got it right during the early days of Afghanistan — and then lost focus. We have never gotten it right in Iraq.

I don’t know what Gen. Sheehan’s background is, but it’s clear he understands what’s necessary to succcessfully influence progress in the Middle East. In short, there are too many people in government formulating policy on the Middle East that don’t know that much about the region, and the short-term thinking that dominates is destined to fail.

Trackposted to Outside the Beltway, Perri Nelson’s Website, The Virtuous Republic, third world county, Faultline USA, stikNstein… has no mercy, DragonLady’s World, Pirate’s Cove, The Pink Flamingo, Cao’s Blog, The Amboy Times, The Bullwinkle Blog, Conservative Cat, Conservative Thoughts, and Right Voices, thanks to Linkfest Haven Deluxe.

This entry was posted on Tuesday, April 17th, 2007 and is filed under Defense Policy, Foreign Policy, Iran, Iraq, Middle East. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.