Mapping A Russian Invasion Of Georgia
With recent speculation about a possible invasion of Georgia by Russia, UltimaRatioRegis and I have developed an outline of likely Russia considerations and actions in executing any “intervention”. The pretext will likely be to come to the aid of ethnic Russians and restore stability should protests widen or get violent, or in the event of a coup. The overarching political consideration for Russia is that it knows it will win the footrace handily in its “near abroad”, and NATO won’t present a very united front, much less intervene in any significant way.
The fundamental working assumptions in estimating the Russian plan are:
Russia’s Political Objectives
- Install a friendly government in Tblisi
- Send a message to the Russian “near abroad” that Moscow won’t hesitate to intervene militarily to protect its interests
- Rebuild diminished national and military prestige after last summer’s poorly executed intervention.
Russian Military Objectives
- Seize and control Tblisi
- Open and secure the land route from Tblisi to Russia
- Secure the port facilities in Poti for support of Russian forces by sea
- Secure the land route from Poti to Tblisi
- Secure necessary air fields for extended air operations
Georgia’s centers of gravity
- Terrain
- Limited transportation infrastructure
- Potential for insurgency
Georgia’s critical vulnerabilities
- Limited ground forces
- No significant naval or air forces
- Limited international support
The Russian scheme of maneuver would be somewhat less subtle this time around, we imagine. Russian forces in Ossetia would push into central Georgia and link up with an air assault on the airfields southeast of Tbilisi. Russia may send some forces to establish a blocking position northwest of the city and move significant forces west toward Gori/Kutaisi. Limited air assaults will likely also be conducted to capture key bridges intact to aid in the western drive, and possibly to seize air facilities near Gori and Kutaisi to support local air operations.
The Georgian army has little by way of armor left after 2008 to stop a bold armored thrust, and has had its artillery capability severely degraded. Russian air and artillery would be used in place of a direct assault on Tbilisi, and might focus on Georgian defensive positions and the destruction of the remnant of the Georgian Army in the Tbilisi area.
It is very likely Russia would also try to secure the Black Sea port facilities in Poti in conjunction with or immediately (48-72 hrs) after the initial invasion. Russian forces already in Abkhazia may push south to seize the port, or amphibious forces could conduct a small air assault to seize the port for further offload or a larger, single amphibious operation on the beaches north of Poti. Speed is very critical for this operation to prevent Georgia from destroying or disabling the port facilities, so an air assault or special operations action is the most likely course of action.
The resultant splitting of Georgian forces and isolation of Poti from any interior reinforcements, particularly in light of Russian air supremacy, would make Russian victory there a matter of time, and not long at that. Once the situation in Poti and outside Tbilisi is recognized as hopeless, the Georgians can be expected to ask for terms.
Expect the Russian Army to have corrected some of its 2008 errors in sloppy reconnaissance and maintenance shortcomings, while at the same time Georgia’s relative capabilties have diminished significantly.
The major event (and main effort) in this invasion will be the armored/mechanized spearhead in multiple division strength, heavily supported by ground attack aircraft and artillery, plunging straight for the one place the Russians KNOW that Georgia will stand and fight (the Capital). The initial objective will be the destruction of the Georgian Army, the accomplishment of which will make Tbilisi an open city.
If Russia acts, we give Georgia ten to fourteen days from the start of hostilities, barring any assistance or extensive preparations to get on a war footing.
In addition, such an operation by Russia would also be a very loud warning shot for the REAL prize: Ukraine.
Get the Yankee Sage delivered!
Bio: I am currently a Professor of Security Studies, hold a BS in Management and an MA in National Security Studies, and am pursuing an MA in Systematic and Philosophical Theology. I've written for Navy Times, Proceedings, Armed Forces Journal and a number of blogs. As a 24-year veteran of the U.S. Navy and Navy Reserve, I attained the rank of Commander, deployed five times for four different conflicts and served as a Foreign Area Officer and a Surface Warfare Officer. During my 7 years in the private sector, I worked in the fields of information technology and publishing, and even ran for public office once.
April 22nd, 2009 at 16:00
Given that recent reports put the Russians at 25 miles from Tbilisi, do you think it may be less than 10-14 days?
April 22nd, 2009 at 16:24
bizjetmech,
We are estimating 1-14 days from beginning of hostilities to end of hostilities. Tbilisi might fall or be surrendered days before that. Time will tell.
URR
April 22nd, 2009 at 16:51
Thanks for the clarification. I was guessing invasion by the end of the week…your opinion?
April 22nd, 2009 at 18:34
1. Russia will not take Tbilisi in the coming days. It will wait until Saakasvhili makes a move again at South Ossetia or Abkhazia or Saakasvili is so stupid to once again attack the demonstrators and opposition parties with brute force. In the last case Russia will try to help the Georgian opposition to take the Georgian throne.
2. Russia had two goals with helping out Abkhazia and South Ossetia. One, o prevent a third time genocide on a minority population in Georgia. Two, to use Abkhazia and South Ossetia as friendly independent nations, so they can build a military presence inside those countries and keep the pressure on both the Georgian dictatorship and NATO.
3. If there is one thing clear for those who know Russia, it is that Russia has no interests in Georgia itself. It has interests in a military presence south for the caucasus mountains (for logistical reasons). Abkazia and South Ossetia is enough. And it has interest in more reasonable, russian friendly neighbors. In stead of USA sponsored maniacs that show more an interest in NATO and EU then in their own citizens.
April 22nd, 2009 at 18:42
Russians might very much like to have the victory locked up by or before the upcoming May 9 Victory Day celebration. For seveal days now I’ve been waking up each morning expecting to be greeted withthe start of operations.
April 22nd, 2009 at 18:48
I remember studying the terrain very closely last year. Light infantry with anti-tank missiles, a strong countermobility effort, and good air defenses would go a long, long way towards fending off the Russians.
Well, good light infantry.
April 22nd, 2009 at 18:51
Ok, that’s all pretty straight forward: Seize chokepoints and either move to encircle T-town with an overland assault or the same with sea-borne assault. Russia has the air, and combat power to spare. Speed is critical as this will play poorly in the media. In your view, what is the G-force’s most likely counter? We in the age of asymetrical war, so more interesting than how to crush Georgia is the question “How do I defend it?”. Assuming Russian SF operations are only marginally successful due to the tension in the region, what’s the big picture for Georgia in terms of defense?
April 22nd, 2009 at 21:14
Do we have any indication that Georgia has managed to buy *anything* in the last year? I haven’t been able to find much on this.
My opinion, as I’ve stated elsewhere, is that Georgia’s only chance at all militarily involves closing the main Russian lines of supply and inflicting enough visible attrition to embarrass Putin. To do this, they will have to pull off commando attacks on the railroad (hard) and Roki tunnel (almost impossible, I’d guess), *and* drive off the Black Sea fleet, which isn’t going to happen at all unless they somehow bought a decent number of truck-mounted ASCMs last year.
Likewise, to hold the capitol and the surrounding countryside, they desperately need good ATGMs, and lots of them–ideally Spike/Eurospike, for use with reverse slope LOAL, but they need something beyond RPGs. They also probably need reloads for their Gadflies, their one really effective weapon last time. Without most or all of those, I don’t see much chance of holding out for any length of time unless Russia does something as stupid as Grozny I.
I will note that they should be able to at least manufacture EFP command-detonated mines in-house even if they can’t buy anything from abroad. Those alone, if properly employed, could make a difference.
April 23rd, 2009 at 06:22
There’s also the internal Russian political situation to think about. Medvedev has made a couple of substantial ‘liberalising’ moves over the past couple of weeks, including an interview with the opposition Novaya Gazeta, and there have been a couple of stories about Putin’s star being on the wane. A quick war would buck up Putin’s fortunes and those of the siloviki caste surrounding him, much as the 2008 war did.
As for substantial partisan resistance – who knows, but if there’s one people I’d not want to fight a guerilla war against, its the Georgians…
April 23rd, 2009 at 12:07
@Seraphiel: This blog and the discussion on it is a place for facts, not your Russian propaganda.
April 23rd, 2009 at 15:20
^ Concur.
April 23rd, 2009 at 17:47
I don’t think that any fighting that the Georgians do up front can stop the Russians. They should concentrate on an insurgency and a media campaign. Concentrate on Russian economic targets (bridges, oil terminals, refineries, power plants, air ports) using RPGs, SAM-7s, IEDs, snipers and small mortars. Just like the Iraqis or the IRA have done (call the media, bomb, run and hide).
April 23rd, 2009 at 18:26
@ryuk: Thats fine by me. Have you lived and worked in both Georgia, and South Ossetia like me?
April 24th, 2009 at 01:06
Whatever Russia’s military mistakes last time (in any event, they won the field didn’t they?), they played the political conflict pretty much flawlessly…given they faced a Bush administration that presumably could have acted much harsher than they did (and don’t forget Condi…a Russiaphile from her academic days…she knows the old Russian general’s personalities better than they know themselves).
Now, the real dilema is the new US administration…
You could argue in fact that Russia’s assessment of the US reaction under Obama is much much less predictable than under Bush. Everyone knew that Bush wasn’t going to intervene militarily, but he made it clear to Russia what the limits were. Now? Who among those frequenting this blog can even hope to guess at what Obama/Clinton will do?
April 24th, 2009 at 01:09
Hey Seraphiel,
What really does “working and living in Georgia..” have to do with the issue that you are interjecting propoganda (from whichever side doesn’t matter, it’s all not welcome).
No one here is rah-rahing for Georgia or Russia…just examining the likely events that may unfold very very soon.
April 24th, 2009 at 16:40
What I’m curious about are Georgia’s long term options. Unless a Georgian genius manages to invent a super-weapon or two, the only thing I can think of would be to take Big D’s notion to the next level and develop a Swiss-style defensive militia (assuming Russia gives them that much time . . .).
May 1st, 2009 at 07:01
[...] Sailor does the hard work of laying out the vagaries of a Russian invasion and an advisable Georgian defense, which are both brief but top-notch. For each, YS approaches [...]