After backing down on initial plans to operate George Washington in the Yellow Sea as part of the initial round of US-RoK exercises in response to the sinking of the Cheonan, State and Defense seem to have come back with a counterpunch that will no doubt knock policymakers in Beijing off balance.

Opening a new source of potential friction with China, the Obama administration said Friday that it would step into a tangled dispute between China and its smaller Asian neighbors over a string of strategically significant islands in the South China Sea.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, speaking at an Asian regional security meeting in Vietnam, stressed that the United States remained neutral on which regional countries had stronger territorial claims to the islands. But she said that the United States had an interest in preserving free shipping in the area and that it would be willing to facilitate multilateral talks on the issue.

Though presented as an offer to help ease tensions, the stance amounts to a sharp rebuke to China.

You can say that again. In all, this is an excellent move and should help disabuse any notion in Chinese planning circles that they have the initiative in this dispute. The big question is, however, will Washington keep the press on, or is this just a one time poke to get Mr. Hu’s attention? I would bet most of the Asia-Pacific hopes we keep pressing.

[Update] No surprise, China’s government is up and spinning on the governor:

The Chinese government reacted angrily on Monday to an announcement by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton that Washington might step into a long-simmering territorial dispute between China and its smaller neighbors in the South China Sea.
…
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi of China warned the United States against wading into the conflict, saying it would increase regional tensions.

“What will be the consequences if this issue is turned into an international or multilateral one?” he asked in remarks published on the Foreign Ministry’s Web site. “It will only make matters worse and the resolution more difficult.”

The state-run news media were far less diplomatic, describing Mrs. Clinton’s speech as “an attack” and a cynical effort to suppress China’s aspirations — and its expanding might.

“America hopes to contain a China with growing military capabilities,” ran an editorial Monday in the Communist Party-run People’s Daily newspaper.

Global Times, an English-language tabloid published by People’s Daily, said, “China will never waive its right to protect its core interest with military means.”

Chris van Avery is a Military Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The views represented herein are his own.

As Washington continues to debate the merits of President Obama’s new arms reduction treaty, there are a few things observers should keep in mind. Kim Holmes does a good job of summarizing these points in the Washington Times. First, the weaknesses:

Today, the greatest nuclear threat comes not from Russia, but from smaller countries, like Iran and North Korea, with little regard for arms control. The administration insists that U.S. ratification of New START will “set an example” for Iran and North Korea. But the treaty doesnt apply to them and will have absolutely no effect on their nuclear-weapons programs. Irrelevant to the main nuclear threats facing America, New START is actually a throwback to the Cold War, when the great nuclear menace was the Soviet Union.

The pact also fails as a breakthrough mechanism for reducing Russias nuclear might. Experts predict Russias strategic forces will drop to 1,000 warheads, which is below the 1,550 level of accountable warheads in New START, with or without the treaty. It does, however, legally lock the U.S. into more reductions. AsYury Savenko, first deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, observed: “Whether the Americans want it or not, they, after adopting the New START treaty, will give us a breathing space that we can use to reform and modernize the countrys nuclear-missile potential.”

Then Holmes presents some rationale:

For two reasons: First, as a grand head fake. Focusing on U.S.-Russia arsenals calls to mind the great arms-control achievements of the Cold War. It makes for great theater. It also takes the spotlight off the administrations inability to stop Iran and North Korea, and possibly terrorists, from gaining nuclear weapons.

Second, the treaty becomes a vehicle for improving relations with Moscow. Russia wants us to sign because 1.) It makes Russia look like our equal; 2.) It forces us to reduce our nuclear weaponry; and 3.) It creates a link between strategic offenses and missile defense – Moscows bete noire.

And lastly, Holmes points out that the language of the treaty could essentially force us back into the ABM Treaty and threaten further development and deployment of missile defense systems.

Where’s the upside? Um…I don’t think there is one.

It appears Russia has decided to take the vanguard to make an end run around the latest round of economic sanctions on Iran. The Jamestown Foundation reports:

On July 14 in Moscow, Russian Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatko, and Iran’s Oil Minister, Masoud Mirkazemi, announced ambitious plans for bilateral cooperation, short-term and long-term. If implemented, these would circumvent two sets of sanctions imposed (outside the UN Security Council) by the United States and other Western countries: sanctions against companies that supply gasoline and other refined oil products to Iran and against those that invest in Iran’s energy sector.

Moscow hosted the Iranian delegation barely two weeks after the enactment of sanctions by the US, EU, and other Western governments against deliveries of oil products (most critically, gasoline) to Iran. The companies Shell, BP, and Total have already stopped such sales, with other Western companies certain to follow suit.

Shmatko, however, announced the opposite intention at the joint news conference with Mirkazemi in Moscow: “Russian companies are prepared to perform deliveries of petroleum products to Iran….The sanctions in no way affect cooperation between Russia and Iran” (Interfax, July 14).

These calculated words signal to Washington (as the main interested party) that Moscow reserves a free hand on this issue. Russia would decide for itself whether, or when and on what conditions, to comply with this set of sanctions or not.

Somebody in Washington has got to wake up to the fact that all these sanction regimes serve to do is limit the economic opportunities of the US and like-minded nations and create opportunities for adversaries. And, in a world where other major powers are emerging and many perceive the US to be on the decline, the incentives for sanction busting are merely increased.

I’ve got a new post up at the USNI blog replying to the concerns of a PLA general to the propose US-RoK combined naval exercise in the Yellow Sea. Here’s a tease:

Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary general with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, recently engaged in an unprecedented online debate about the U.S. intent to conduct a major, combined US-RoK exercise in the Yellow Sea in response to North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan. Following are the summaries of his arguments, courtesy of People’s Daily, with my responses:

First, in terms of security, Chairman Mao Zedong once said, “We will never allow others to keep snoring beside our beds.” If the United States were in China’s shoes, would it allow China to stage military exercises near its western and eastern coasts? Just like an old Chinese saying goes, “Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you,” if the United States does not wish to be treated in a specific way, it should not forcefully sell the way to others.

Would the US allow such exercises? In a word, yes. Unless Washington was willing to publicly abandon freedom of navigation as a vital interest, it would have no other choice but to permit such an exercise. In fact, while many Americans have forgotten, for decades it was rather routine for Soviet naval forces to prowl up and down the Eastern Seaboard. The American response was merely to track, observe and wait for the next time.

Read More

Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary general with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, recently engaged in an unprecedented online debate about the U.S. intent to conduct a major, combined US-RoK exercise in the Yellow Sea in response to North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan. Following are the summaries of his arguments, courtesy of People’s Daily, with my responses:

First, in terms of security, Chairman Mao Zedong once said, “We will never allow others to keep snoring beside our beds.” If the United States were in China’s shoes, would it allow China to stage military exercises near its western and eastern coasts? Just like an old Chinese saying goes, “Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you,” if the United States does not wish to be treated in a specific way, it should not forcefully sell the way to others.

Would the US allow such exercises? In a word, yes. Unless Washington was willing to publicly abandon freedom of navigation as a vital interest, it would have no other choice but to permit such an exercise. In fact, while many Americans have forgotten, for decades it was rather routine for Soviet naval forces to prowl up and down the Eastern Seaboard. The American response was merely to track, observe and wait for the next time.

Second, in terms of strategic thinking, China should take into account the worst possibility and strive to seek the best results. The bottom line of strategic thinking is to nip the evil in the bud. The ultimate level of strategic thinking is to subdue the enemy without fighting. Preventing crisis is the best way to resolve and overcome the crisis. China’s current tough stance is part of preventive diplomacy.

I’m really not sure what this means. If on one hand General Luo is characterizing Beijing’s stance towards Pyongyang’s behavior as “tough”, he and I obviously have different understandings of the word “tough”. If on the other hand the General is characterizing Beijing’s stand against the combined exercise as “tough”, the general may be right–Washington may be subdued “without fighting” and Sun Tzu will be smiling in his grave.

Third, in terms of geopolitical strategy, the Yellow Sea is the gateway to China’s capital region and a vital passage to the heartland of Beijing and Tianjin. In history, foreign invaders repeatedly took the Yellow Sea as an entrance to enter the heartland of Beijing and Tianjin. The drill area selected by the United States and South Korea is only 500 kilometers away from Beijing. China will be aware of the security pressure from military exercises conducted by any country in an area that is so close to China’s heartland.

The aircraft carrier U.S.S. George Washington dispatched to the Yellow Sea has a combat radius of 600 kilometers and its aircraft has a combat radius as long as 1,000 kilometers. Therefore, the military exercise in the area has posed a direct security threat to China’s heartland and the Bohai Rim Economic Circle.

Again, I can’t be certain where this is going, but it appears to be yet another attempt to try and lay claim to historical ownership of a wide swath of international waters and limit not just military access, but all access, betraying Beijing’s long-term desire to shape the interpretation of the Law of the Sea to China’s advantage.

Fourth, in a bid to safeguard security on the Korean Peninsula, the U. N. Security Council has just issued a presidential statement, requiring all parties to remain calm and restrained to the so-called “Cheonan” naval ship incident, which had caused a major crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

On the other hand, the joint military exercise by the United States and South Korea on the Yellow Sea has created a new crisis. This is another reason why China strongly opposes the military exercise on the Yellow Sea. In order to safeguard security on the Korea Peninsula, no country should create a new crisis instead they should control and deal with the existing one.

I read a lot, and from what I’ve read, the exercise only represents a “crisis” to Beijing. No one–not even the leadership in Pyongyang–believes such an exercise might be used to stage a reprisal for the sinking of the Cheonan.

Fifth, in terms of maintaining China-U.S. relations, especially the two parties’ military relations, China must declare its solemn stance. China has been working to promote the healthy development of China-U.S. military relations. Therefore, China has clearly declared that it is willing to promote the development of the two parties’ relations. Deputy Director of the General Staff Gen. Ma Xiaotian has also expressed his welcome to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to visit China at a proper time.

This a classic, passive-aggressive response if I’ve ever seen one. Perhaps translated it might read, “Sec. Gates can visit China when America learns how to behave.”

Chris van Avery is a Military Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The views represented herein are his own.

I recently had an opportunity to sit down in a roundtable with two colleagues and two analysts from a thinktank which shall remain nameless to discuss China’s rise. The conversation was freewheeling and I was again struck by the well-integrated, multidimensional efforts by Beijing to position themselves on the world stage. For this audience, there are some consensus points I’d like to throw out for your consideration:

First, China’s behavior is not all about us. This is a common pitfall in American thinking, and must be avoided at all cost. China has critical concerns about India, and a variety of situations in Africa, in Central Northeast and Southeast Asia and in the Middle East which factor heavily in their decision making process. We’re an important competitor, perhaps even the most important one, but we don’t even occupy a majority of Beijing’s thinking time–economically or militarily.

Second, Beijing’s top two priorities remain defending the Party’s authority and position and ensuring internal problems don’t threaten that authority and position. All of Beijing’s calculus is founded upon this, and they would change a policy–any policy–without hesitation if they thought there was a better way to ensure the survival and success of the party.

Third, China’s not merely working to exploit the international system, they’re trying to force the international system to adapt favorably to Beijing’s outlook and preferred business rules. Beijing has finally embraced the notion that a common international system is a useful thing, but the China’s pushing for changes in the international system–on every front they can think of–that reflect Beijing’s worldview rather than the worldview of the West.

Finally, The U.S. is not alone in its discomfort with China’s rise. The narratives that end with China as the world’s sole superpower or a bipolar world with the U.S. and China in opposition to one another makes policy makers squirm in their chairs from India to Southeast Asia to the E.U. to Russia. Even influential nations and blocks in Africa and South America don’t like those scenarios, and many nations will be working to prevent them from becoming reality. In summary, there’s hope and we’re not alone.

Michael Auslin at AEI is piecing together the recent activities of America and her allies, and the picture that’s shaping up isn’t pretty:

Decisions by the governments of Japan and Great Britain and the passage of the bankrupting health care bill in the US spell the coming end of America’s overseas basing and ability to project power. Should these trends continue, the US military will lose its European and Asian strategic anchors, hastening America’s eventual withdrawal from its global commitments and leaving the world a far more uncertain and unstable place.

To sum up his arguments, Britain and Japan’s recent decisions to reach for their own “reset buttons” with America, combined with an unprecedented budgetary mess in Washington may result in America having no money to pay for forward deployed power, and no friends willing to host forward deployed forces for extended periods. Given that the U.S. has been the most active nation in working to bring about stability–and the one most willing to do heavy lifting–the product of these changes will be more global instability.

The “stinger” has not yet been struck, but it appears for all intents and purposes America’s pushing itself–and being helped in our efforts–towards the world’s brow. What say you?

With the inauguration of Barack Obama as President, the debate over nuclear deterrence and disarmament has sprung back to the forefront of international debate. The end of the Cold War brought about an initial euphoria that the threat of nuclear annihilation had dissipated and dramatic changes in the deterrence postures of the major powers could be enacted. Time, though, has shown that prevailing doctrines of nuclear deterrence are essentially unchanged between the major powers. The change that has created a need for further development of nuclear deterrence doctrine in the last twenty years, however, is the appearance of nations with small nuclear forces (SNF) and non-state actors pursuing nuclear capability.

From the start of the 20th Century to the beginning of WWII, deterrence relied upon conventional arms races and preventive war. The German pre-WWI posture serves as an excellent example. The Germans relied on starting a preventive war against Russia and France to prevent being attacked itself. The Germans could see they were gradually being eclipsed by French and Russian military power and believed war was inevitable, so Germany chose to fight while they were still relatively strong. Similar thinking is documented in Germany and Japan at the start of the Second World War, and one can argue that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was itself a preventive war.

Later, following the advent of atomic weapons, theories of nuclear deterrence arose. Of these theories, there were two major schools of thought: 1) deterrence by punishment–retaliation against population centers in the event of an attack—and 2) deterrence by denial–a successful first strike against an opponent’s arsenal. The U.S. and Russia pursued both strategies at one time and another.

A third theory, existential deterrence, emerged following the Cuban missile crisis and argued it was the fear of nuclear war that made deterrence work and resulted in a “tradition of non-use.” These theories worked well to prevent nuclear conflict and direct confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but as McGeorge Bundy pointed out in “The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy”, this nuclear stalemate did little to prevent any of the large number of proxy wars between the two superpowers.

As stated before, it seems little has changed in the postures of the major nuclear powers, despite the end of the Cold War and emerging American nuclear primacy. Surely, the U.S. and Russia have dramatically cut their stockpiles since the end of the Cold War and removed tactical nuclear weapons from forward bases and deployed ships and submarines, but both nations maintained strategic missile submarines (as do the Chinese, French and British), the U.S. and Russia still maintain large stockpiles, and strategic forces remain on high alert.

In recent years, however, a number of developments have challenged the hopes of those pursuing complete disarmament. American success in developing ballistic missile defense systems has Russia seeking to block full deployment of the system, and Russia and China both developing means to counter an American shield should it be deployed. In addition, ongoing unilateral and bi-lateral disarmament efforts by the U.S. and Russia have not deterred nations like India, Pakistan, N. Korea and Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, and China from expanding its strategic forces. And most recently, a deputy chief of staff for the Russian Navy told state-run media that Moscow was reconsidering its decision to not deploy tactical weapons aboard ships.

Going forward into the 21st Century, a number of changes in the balance of nuclear power have resulted in doubts about the utility of current doctrines of nuclear deterrence. Today there are three major challenges to future nuclear deterrence: 1) the small nuclear forces of new atomic states, 2) anti-state or non-state actors, and 3) the return of preventive war as an acceptable deterrence doctrine.

In the case of nations possessing SNF, like Pakistan and India, the applicability of traditional theories of deterrence are shaky at best. Deterrence by denial by a SNF is useless against opponents with large nuclear forces (LNF), and against other SNF powers the applicability depends upon many other factors, like intelligence, delivery and early warning systems. Deterrence by punishment, again, may be effective against other SNF states, but against LNF states it has minimal value. And existential deterrence’s effectiveness depends heavily on the cultural and religious values of the SNF state and might be impossible to quantify.

The dangers posed by anti-state actors in the nuclear balance of power are even more troubling. Deterrence is based on reason, and while states are generally “rational actors”, terrorist organizations (essentially “anti-state” actors) are often “irrational actors.” States have stable political and military systems and organizations, with checks and balances, populations, territory and resources to protect, and have a vested interest in being rational and predictable. Anti-state actors, however, have none of these elements, usually possess radical political or religious ideologies, and often take pride in their unpredictability and willingness to escalate conflicts.

Complicating this is the fact that anti-state actors also work to destabilize the very systems and organizations that make state actors rational. In The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash Between State and Antistate Actors, Mohan Malik concludes that South Asia is particularly vulnerable to the influence of anti-state actors, as the nations in the region have yet to fully develop the checks and balances in their political systems and mature, redundant controls over their arsenals.

There appears to be some progress with respect to the SNF problems. India has made gains in stabilizing and securing their arsenal to address the dangers of SNF and anti-state actors as an example to other new nuclear powers. First, India has adopted a strict policy of no first use. Second, India asserts that it will not resort to nukes against non-nuclear and non-aligned states. India’s current doctrine is focused on denial by punishment, and they are pursuing a triad of air, land and sea based systems to ensure second strike capability. Third, India has enforced strict civilian control by democratically elected leaders through a survivable command and control system, and their arsenal is protected by adequate security and safety systems to prevent unauthorized use. And fourth, though India will not accept limitations on its maintenance, testing and research and development, its stated goal is to continue to emphasize and pursue global nuclear disarmament.

Where no progress has been made is with regard to the irrational state and anti-state actors. The Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive war was intended as a step towards addressing the new security threats, but there are many dangers inherent in this approach. With the invasion of Iraq the Global War on Terror became as much a war of counterproliferation as a war on terrorism.

In the past nonproliferation and counterproliferation entailed diplomacy, sanctions, deterrence, defenses and the capacity to strike at another nation’s nuclear arsenal, command and control and delivery systems. This shift is a tacit acknowledgement that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not guarantee a nation will not develop or acquire nuclear arms. Deterrence now, at least for the time being, has broadened to include not just deterring a nuclear state from using their weapons, but also includes preventing non-nuclear states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, the traditional approach failed miserably and with respect to Iran, this approach appears destined to fail. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine and preoccupation of America’s conventional military on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may have actually had the opposite effect and accelerated development efforts by states that were already pursuing nuclear weapons.

All of which raises an obvious question: where do the nuclear powers and deterrence go from here? The current global security situation has been and will continue to be a challenge to large and small powers alike. Major powers are confronted with threats that their vast arsenals appear useless to deter, and have reverted to risky, offensive doctrines of the past. In response, small powers and anti-state actors are deciding to pursue nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in attempts to deter powers they believe are irrational, uncontrollable threats.

So, with the vexing problem of irrational states and anti-state actors rendering deterrence by denial and existential deterrence too difficult to rehabilitate, deterrence by punishment seems to be the only remaining option. And, given the inherent differences between irrational states and anti-state actors, a rehabilitation of deterrence by punishment requires two distinct doctrines.

With respect to the threat from current and aspirant SNF nations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently made a comment about extending the U.S. defense “umbrella” to unnamed nations in response to Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal. Though forced to backtrack quickly when her statement was interpreted as an acceptance of Iran becoming a nuclear power, her idea was close to the mark. It only missed by making the defended class too narrow. The U.S. and its nuclear allies in NATO could easily revive the doctrine of deterrence by punishment by declaring they would individually or jointly execute nuclear reprisals against any nation that initiates a first strike without an unambiguous and immediate threat to the attacking state’s national survival. Such a policy would even bring Iran under the defense umbrella of NATO’s nuclear powers should they be the victim of an uninvited first strike.

Finally, with respect to the problem of anti-state actors, the nuclear powers of NATO could warn all nations that, should an unexplained nuclear detonation take place in the world, any nation found to have willfully provided nuclear materials or technology to the perpetrators would be subject to the severest of sanctions, including suspension or expulsion from international organizations and programs, complete economic isolation, a freezing of all the state’s assets, being disconnected from international communications networks, and even nuclear reprisal.

Foreign Policy notes two British scholars find soft power in an unexpected place:

Sometimes it takes non-American voices to identify America’s strengths. Such is the case with the new book by the British writers (and Economist editors) John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge with the audacious title God is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith is Changing the World. About half of the book is a survey of the seemingly endless — and endlessly creative — varieties of religion in the United States, while the other half of the book profiles a range of important religious movements around the world. Though in most cases it is not that religious faith has “re-appeared” after a long secular decline, but rather that elite observers are finally noticing what has been true all along: the vast majority of people outside the West, and many people in the West, are religious.
…
Religious freedom is central to Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s argument as well. As breezy and sometimes sprawling as the book is, the authors attempt to tie it together around a provocative thesis: the American religious system of disestablishment, choice, and competition, is becoming the ascendant religious model around the world. This is also a potent illustration, they believe, of American soft power. Whether consciously or not, religious leaders and movements across different faiths and spanning many nations are finding growth and success through models pioneered in America: independence, innovation, communication through new media, and energetic appeals for new adherents.

Of course, it’s no surprise that the U.S. government would not expand and highlight its efforts in the area of religious freedom, lest some of our more fanatical adversaries wave it as proof of a Western crusade against Islam.

Inspiring and unsettling at the same time:

My intuition tells me Iran has reached a tipping point, but which way it will tip is still not known. Either it will tip towards more freedom (though not necessarily objectively free or democratic by Western standards) or it will tip towards something more like a Taliban-style authoritarian theocracy. Pray the Iranians get the former and not the latter.